This independence is available in General in three ways

Any (pre-) campaign is an opportunity for proposals more or less feasible and desirable. The Socialist leadership candidates in turn claimed the change of the Statute of the European Central Bank (ECB) or the reorientation of its policy. The Socialist project, he advocates "a priority for full employment which must inspire the policies of the euro area but the ECB also which articles need to be revised". UMP calls a "more balanced" European monetary policy and its potential presidential candidate, even if it is in does not directly in the articles, is is also pleased to castigate the monetary orthodoxy of the Bank. Finally, the Prime Minister himself has recently made statements in the same direction.

All these proposals revolve around the same idea: the independence of the European Central Bank and its policy, with its primary objective of price stability, should be reviewed to promote employment and growth. This type of position is not justified, or even dangerous. The need for independence of the Central Bank, ECB or other, is now advocated by the vast majority of economists at the international level. This independence is available in General in three ways. Operational independence (the Central Bank develops and implements its policy monetary outside influence, the less explicit and institutional, political powers). Independence of the leaders (of course appointed by Governments, but not revocable for a predetermined period). And "financial" independence (the Central Bank a prohibition to lend to the Member States). The purpose of this independence is "disconnect" the monetary policy of political pressures and electoral cycles. Theory and experience indicate that other central banks are generally evidence of an inflationary bias which, ultimately, is unfavourable to growth and employment (for nothing say occult redistributions resulting). The independence of the Central Bank's policy is therefore to remove the risk of use of the monetary policy purposes too policies, risks damaging the property term general economic being, including the stability of prices, employment and growth.

Reforming the so-called ECB missions to promote the employment is neither desirable nor achievable and hand of an erroneous assumption. To say that the ECB has the unique objective control of inflation (translated as near 2 price growth year) and that it cares not for employment (or growth) is a doubly false assertion, both from the point of view of its statutes and its practice of monetary policy.

After the Maastricht Treaty which forms the basis of the Constitution, "the main objective of the ESCB European system of central banks is to maintain price stability." "Without prejudice to the objective of price stability, the ESCB supports ... to the achievement of the objectives of the community", which means that employment and growth are also part of the objectives. Moreover, empirical studies show that the ECB considers well the situation of growth and employment in the conduct of its policy.

The objective of the rise in the price control is not an "ideological" position or the result of the victory of a few ultra-liberal lobbies moqueraient of unemployment, as it is sometimes, but actually the result of many years of economic research. It does not imply a "benign neglect" of economic prosperity and employment.

Inflation is a disruption of economic behaviour, detrimental to the economy and hence long-term employment. The best way to reduce unemployment and to bring him back at the structural level, that can make the Central Bank, is to fight inflation in a credible and sustainable manner. If the unemployment rate is still too high, this is not the responsibility of the central banker, but mainly the political powers and their economic policy (budget, taxation, labour costs, market regulation, etc.). Wear the hat of our structural unemployment too high the ECB is unjustified. And the conduct of monetary policy more expansionary to do so would lead to cruel disappointments. As monetary policy in recent years has proven more accommodating than restrictive, and for some too accommodating, i.e. neglecting a little too much control of the monetary creation, and thus, term, inflation.

Then, should we reform the statutes of the ECB Just see that it is not. In addition, has been said, these are the direct consequence of the Treaty of Maastricht. After the failure of the European Constitution, which today would dare to start in a revision of Maastricht Even if it was justified, and we have seen that this is not the case, the idea of amendment of the statutes of the ECB is very unrealistic, if not demagogical.